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ABSTRACT
Division of attitudes towards immigration policy is more polarized than ever (Public
Religion Research Institute, 2018). Historically, restrictive attitudes towards immigration
policies have been highest in times of rising nationalist ideals and economic vulnerability (Jaret,
1999; Ngai, 2004). Primarily a federal responsibility, immigration enforcement was
decentralized and that power shared with individual states (Pantoja, 2006), leading to policy
disparities among states (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019; Gulasekaram et al., 2015; Johnson, 2019).
Studies focusing on the relationship between state economic context and immigration policies,
found that states that are more economically vulnerable had higher numbers of restrictive
immigration policies (Ybarra et al., 2016). While some point to economic factors, others have
found that political ideology and political party alignment are more influential (Brooks et al.,
2016; Natter et al., 2020).
This study explored the relationship between economic context and attitudes towards
immigration policies. I found a significant difference in attitudes towards immigration policies
by political party identification. Democrat had the lowest median score (12.583) meaning they
held more welcoming attitudes, Independent had the next lowest (16.2732), and Republican had
the highest score (21.3464) However, I found no significant relationship (-0.032; p=0.05)
between state-level economic context and individual attitudes towards immigration policies or
state-level economic context and state average attitudes towards immigration policies (-0.003;
p=0.05), or individual income levels (p=0.963) and employment levels (p=0.095).
The evidence of a significant relationship between attitudes towards immigration policy
political party affiliation has implications for policy, namely the need for bipartisan support and
highlighting ways that immigration reform benefits all parties. For social work practice
vi

implications of this study point toward need for education and transparency about benefits of
immigration to clients and combatting misinformation that exists surrounding the subject.
Exploring how political party affiliation and economic factors interact to shape attitudes towards
immigration policies, and how this in turn affect the development of policy legislation will help
to understand the overall relationship.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The American middle class, once comprising a clear majority of the population, is
shrinking along with it’s share of the nation’s aggregate income (Horowitz, Igielnik, & Kochhar,
2018). While the individual income rate of the upper-class is steadily growing with 64% increase
of total income since 1970, that of the middle class has only increased 49% and that of the lower
income only experiencing a 43% gain (Horowitz et al., 2018). This data reflects an era of ever
widening economic divide that helps the upper-class cement their financial status, while the
middle and lower-income tiers struggle to adapt to inflation and basic living expenses. Though
the economic stagnation of 2018 was experienced differently along economic statuses, the entire
nation has been in a period of slow growth in comparison to the years before the Great Recession
and slowed from 1.2% to 0.3%, resulting in a median loss of $12,400 for the average American
household income (Horowitz et al., 2018). As economic inequality has widened and the economy
stagnated, the ideological divide has deepened, one area in particular is with immigration and
attitudes towards immigration policies (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). According to a
recent study though, attitudes about immigration are near equally divided between those that
support welcoming policies and those that support restrictive policies, more individuals fall at the
extreme ends of the spectrum, and there are far fewer moderates than ever (Public Religion
Research Institute, 2018).
This divide is reflected in Congress, which has been deadlocked in regard to immigration
reform for years (Ybarra, 2016). These realities are reflected in the policies that are currently
being debated include building a wall along the U.S. Mexican border, the amount of asylee and
refugee visas being given, detainment and family separation, as well as local law enforcement
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. This has real consequences for the immigrant

population already living in the country, as well as those seeking residency status. Immigrant
detainment has now led to 214 deaths since 2003 due to severe medical neglect, as well as
children who have been separated from their families to never be reunited again (Detention
Watch Network, 2019).
Beyond detention, there are those that are left in limbo at the borders, sometimes having
traveled hundreds of miles away from their home countries to flee dangerous circumstances, only
to find themselves in other dangerous situations on their journey and while waiting at the border
(American Immigration Council, 2019). Policies including “metering,” or limiting the number of
individuals who are permitted to access the asylum process each day at ports of entry on the
Mexican border, and Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which require asylum seekers to
remain in Mexico while they await their court date, leave asylum seekers vulnerable to
trafficking, unsafe living conditions, and even death (American Immigration Council, 2019).
Individual attitudes inform our decisions on who we choose to represent us in state and
federal government as we elect those that reflect our views. Through influencing voters’ attitudes
concerning immigration, we can influence who is in Congress creating those policies that affect
the lives of immigrants in the U.S. and those seeking immigration status. Perhaps economic
factors are at the heart of this change.
As states have become more involved in regulating immigration, understanding how state
level economic context affects individual attitudes can help us to better understand their
relationship. Research on attitudes towards immigration and economics primarily focused on
national attitudes (Jaret, 1999; Pantoja, 2006) or on how the economy impacts immigration
legislation (Ybarra, 2016). Where it is lacking is on the state economic front. This gap could be
filled through exploring the growing divide in immigration attitudes may prove to be key in
2

understanding the overall relationship. Furthermore, exploring other factors in economic context
and influences on attitude formation like individual income, employment status and political
ideology. Do states with a lower level of state economic wellbeing have a statistically significant
relationship with restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies and vice versa? Do individual
economic factors like income and employment status have an influence on what immigration
policies one supports? What is the relationship between sanctuary policy support and individual
income and employment? Or is political ideology at the core of immigration attitude formation?
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the history of immigration policy as well as the current era of
decentralization of immigration enforcement. I then describe the existing research on the
relationship between state and individual economic factors and on attitudes towards immigration
policies. Chapter 3 details my process in choosing methods and defining the variables of my
study. In Chapter 4, I display my results using correlation and ANOVA analyses. I explore the
questions of which factors have the most impact on immigration attitudes on a regional, state and
individual level. Chapter 5 explores and discusses these results as well as how they fit into the
previous literature, followed by Chapter 6 in which I will discuss conclusions made from this
research and implications for social work practice, police and research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Attitudes towards immigration policies have evolved throughout U.S. history, fluctuating
between periods of restrictive and welcoming attitudes (Jaret, 1999; Pantoja, 2006; Ybarra et al.,
2016). These changes in attitudes have direct impacts on policy implementations (Nafziger,
2009; Pantoja, 2006). As immigration enforcement has become increasingly decentralized, there
is now more variation in policy by state (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019). I first discuss trends in
immigration attitudes throughout U.S. history and the modern era of immigration enforcement
decentralization as well as the specific policy disparities among states. I then describe the effects
of the economy on a state, regional and individual level including income and employment on
those policies. Finally, I identify gaps in the research surrounding state-level economic
implications.
History of Immigration Policy and Attitudes
Restrictive immigration attitudes have been found to be highest during times of economic
downturn and when the country is experiencing greater numbers of immigrants from countries
outside of Western Europe (Jaret, 1999). From his research he found that this is due to the drive
of individuals to protect their own financial wellbeing and worry over loss of national identity or
heterogenization (Jaret, 1999). Early in the history of our country and throughout much of the
18th and 19th centuries, immigration was relatively free and open reflecting a laissez-faire attitude
towards mobility that dated back to the colonial period (Ngai, 2004). The migration of the first
European settlers from England to the United States is an example of that previous freedom of
movement that was allowed before immigration restriction began (Ngai, 2004). In the 19th
century immigration in the United States was encouraged and unfettered, driven by the capitalist
need for more workers from around the world to support the labor needs of the industrial
4

revolution (Ngai, 2004). Immigration attitudes at this time were welcoming due to the positive
impact it had on the economy and the cheap labor the immigrants brought (Ngai, 2004). Even
before the enactment of the first immigration law, economic factors still surrounded and
influenced immigration attitudes.
In the earliest policies regarding immigration restriction, we can see the impact of both
nationalist ideals and economic factors. Because immigrant labor helped to sustain the economic
boon and development of the United States, attitudes at this time were overwhelmingly positive
and immigration was encouraged to sustain the growth of a new nation (Ngai, 2004).
In the mid 1800’s, Chinese workers began migrating to the United States primarily to
work in the gold mines, but also to work in agriculture, factories and on the railroad (Ngai,
2004). Anti-Chinese immigrant sentiments began to grow at this time as Chinese laborers
worked for lower wages than American workers, often beating out American workers for labor
(Ngai, 2004). This combined with the stark ethnic contrast in comparison to dominantly AngloSaxon immigrants of the past, clashed with the dominant American view of national identity and
had an impact on the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the first U.S. immigration
policy to place regulations of immigrants from an entire country (Ngai, 2004).
World War I spurred a global trend of tightening and better defining national borders and
the creation of passports and visas, ending the laissez-faire mentality surrounding migration
(Ngai, 2004). In line with this trend, the U.S. passed the Johnson Reed Immigration Act of 1924,
which established the passport and visa requirement, as well as the quota system that placed
numerical limits on immigration based on nationality and race (Ngai, 2004). The restrictions of
this immigration policy were influenced by both the rise in nationalism after the Great War and a
decrease in need for manual labor in manufacturing industries as more implemented
5

technological advances and mass production (Ngai, 2004). This new job scarcity was paired with
warnings of large quantities of impoverished immigrants fleeing countries devastated by the war
to the United States which fanned anti-immigrant sentiments (Ngai, 2004).
Not only was the creation of the quota system effected by these factors, but also the
implementation as the number of immigrants allowed entry from each country was connected to
the economic and political relationship with their country of nationality (Ngai, 2004). The turn of
the 20th century was highlighted as a period of both economic struggle due to unfair working
conditions and compensation before many modern labor and health regulation and general
xenophobia, as immigrants from Eastern Europe were increasing in immigration numbers in
comparison to Western Europe (Jaret, 1999). While the earlier half of the century saw a majority
of immigrants coming from European countries, the 1960’s began an increase of immigration
from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, who were viewed as more “other” than Western
European immigrants (Jaret, 1999). During this time anti-immigration sentiment rose again due
to attitudes created by fear of losing a national identity and heterogenization (Jaret, 1999). These
attitudes have the ability to create a lasting impact on policy and the realities faced by
immigrants in the U.S. (Reyna, Dobria & Wetherell, 2013).
Decentralization of Immigration Policy
Two policies enacted in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), had lasting impact on immigration (Pantoja, 2006). U.S. immigration enforcement
was historically handled at a national level until IIRIRA was enacted, which allowed states to
share in burden of the enforcement of immigration law through decentralization (Pantoja, 2006).
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IIRIRA devolved immigration enforcement to the individual states, creating disparities in
enforcement and access to social services (Pantoja, 2006).
Attitudes towards immigrants in the 1990’s centered on fear of creating a dependent state
and immigrants being public charges of the welfare system (Pantoja, 2006). The enactment of
PRWORA in 1996 stripped the security net from under immigrants, through a policy that
prohibits them from accessing federal support during their first five years in the United States
(Pantoja, 2006). The exclusionary attitudes towards immigration of the 1990s changed to
xenophobia and distrust in the 2000s after the events of September 11, 2001 (Nafziger, 2009).
The policies again reflected attitudes and misplaced fear that Americans were feeling with the
passing of the Homeland Security Act in 2002 and the subsequent creation of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, or ICE (Nafziger, 2009). The formation of ICE has turned the issue of
immigration enforcement into a criminal issue instead of the civil issue that it is (Douglas &
Sáenz, 2013). This combined with private prisons contracting out beds to ICE, immigrants,
asylees, and refugees can find themselves in prison facilities. (Douglas & Sáenz, 2013).
Now, more than a decade after the events of September 11, 2001, Public Religion
Research Institute asserts that attitudes are trending more positively towards immigrants of all
backgrounds, yet immigrants find themselves in an ever-hostile environment (2018). The most
people in the history of the PRRI survey support reducing immigration levels and a majority
agree that immigrants strengthen the country, are hard-working, don’t want to be supported by
welfare and have strong family values (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). This is at odds
with the current policies immigrants are facing. Detention numbers in 2019 reached an average
daily population of 50,165 and an annual total of 510,854 (Detention Watch Network, 2019).
This is a staggering statistic given reports of inhumane conditions within the detention centers,
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accusations of forced sterilizations (Hamilton, 2011) and family separations (Aranda & Vaquera,
2018) on an ever-growing number of detainee deaths (Detention Watch Network, 2019).
Though immigration attitudes are trending positively, they are more divided than ever
with the minority not only somewhat supporting, but strongly supporting these punitive policies
(Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). This divisiveness can create a gridlock in Congress
concerning immigration reform and has led to disparities in state immigration policies (Butz &
Kehrberg, 2019). While federal legislation still governs overarching immigration policy, states
have the ability to pass laws that support a more welcoming or restrictive environment for
immigrants through state-level policies concerning employment restrictions, law enforcement
policies, education opportunity, access to public services and welfare, and even those as simple
as obtaining a driver’s license (Gulasekaram et al., 2015). Particularly the discussion of law
enforcement policies and cooperation with ICE interventions has been in the forefront of current
debates, much due to the disparities between states with or without sanctuary policies (Johnson,
2019). The state of California was the first to adopt a sanctuary policy, a law that prohibits law
enforcement officials from inquiring about an individual’s immigration status or holding them
without a criminal warrant (Johnson, 2019). Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Vermont have adopted similar policies (Johnson, 2019). Sanctuary policies do help
to mitigate the negative impact of federal immigration enforcement, but in other states the
policies can be vastly different.
In contrast to the sanctuary policies of other states, states like Arizona penned new
legislation in 2010 requiring law enforcement to explicitly question every person arrested about
their immigration status (National Immigration Law Center, 2011). Five other states, Utah,
Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina followed suit and passed similar laws. Other
8

states including Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and Tennessee have enacted
policies to discourage sanctuary cities by blocking funding (Gulasekaram et al., 2019). Texas, a
state with one of the highest populations of immigrants in the country, signed SB 4 to discourage
Austin from continuing with its sanctuary policies by blocking state funding to the city.
(Gulasekaram et al., 2019).
Beyond sanctuary policy, there are other welcoming policies that states are enacting. Ten
states and the District of Columbia allow unauthorized immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses, a
major barrier to everyday life in the US (National Immigration Law Center, 2020). Twenty-four
states supported President Obama’s executive actions to grant work permits to nearly four
million unauthorized immigrants already living in the country and to protect them from
deportation (National Immigration Law Center, 2020).
The other twenty-six states not only opposed the executive action, but filed a lawsuit
challenging it (National Immigration Law Center, 2020), favoring more restrictive immigration
policies. Florida, which is home to more immigrants than any other state, was one of those
twenty-six. The expansion of a program called Secure Communities (SCOMM) sparked the
extreme criminalization of immigration enforcement that we recognize today (Nowrasteh, 2017).
The expansion of this policy made it mandatory for local law enforcement to cooperate with
federal immigration enforcement (Sktrentny & Lopez, 2013). One purpose cited for this was to
remove “dangerous criminals” and “undeserving immigrants” (Sktrentny & Lopez, 2013).
Again, attitudes revolving around fear of danger and financial strain are at the core of the
decisions. In 2008, the country maintained less than 100 beds in prisons for immigration
detention, but by the end of 2014 that number had risen to more than 3,000 (Collingwood, Morin
& El-Khatib, 2018). Many of the ICE detention contracts went to private prison corporations like
9

CCA and The GEO Group, both of which earned over 3 billion dollars in 2016 (Collingwood et
al., 2018). Federal cooperation with the private prison industry, which has a high stake in
keeping their beds occupied and strong lobbying power, doesn’t lead to accommodating policies
being embraced. In 2015 Obama replaced SCOMM with the Priority Enforcement Program that
was more targeted at serious offenders and did not mandate local law enforcement to cooperate
in immigration enforcement (Nowrasteh, 2017). This change in policy reflected the attitudes
towards immigrants steadily becoming more positive during the latter part of the 2010’s (Public
Religion Research Institute, 2018).
Economic Context and Attitudes toward Immigration
Given the patterns observed in the close fluctuations of the trends in both economies and
changes in immigration policy, it’s essential to understand how those patterns differ in varying
economic contexts. One study analyzed the effects of the economy on democratic societies and
found that when the economy is perceived as “bad” voters are less likely to support expansionist
policies like welfare funding or immigration reform, in other words, when voters are more
concerned about their well-being, their attitudes towards issues concerning immigration become
more conservative, even over political ideology (Kim & Fording, 2001). While Kim and Fording
(2001) examined the effects of the economy on 13 Western democracies as a whole, the overall
picture of the economic landscape is missing for countries, like the U.S., in which state economy
varies greatly to the national economy.
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 showed us that while we may experience a nationwide economic downturn, the effects at the state-level can vary, with some experiencing worse
decline than the nation’s average, and others experiencing a boom (Ybarra et al., 2016). The
same was observed in 2018 and continuing into the current time as once booming manufacturing
10

and agricultural businesses have been steadily declining, while tech and service industries are
increasing (Whiton & Muro, 2019). States in the upper Midwest like Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin which rely heavily on manufacturing revenue have therefore suffered greater
economically than states with thriving tech industries like Massachusetts, California, Delaware,
and the District of Columbia (Atkinson & Nager, 2014).
In the 2016 elections, many voters voted outside of their party and the economy was a
major swaying factor in states where the economy was weaker (Kolko, 2016). In fact, the
manufacturing industry, which was once starkly blue, has reversed to majority red-leaning
(Whiton & Muro, 2019). By 2013, it was found that support for accommodating immigration
policies declines as confidence in the economy deteriorates. Rhetoric was used which reflected
sentiments from the 1990’s surrounding immigrants being harmful for the economy and “taking”
jobs from the American worker (Esposito & Finley, 2019).
In another study, Wilson found that when Americans feel that their employment status is
in jeopardy that they will hold more restrictive immigration views in order to protect their own
self-interests, even though immigrants have been proven to be a net benefit to the economy
(2001). He further went on to find that these attitudes have significant influence on their policy
preferences and implications for which candidates they prefer (Wilson, 2001). While Wilson
studied the attitudes towards immigrants as a whole, a different study from 2017 expanded upon
these findings to say that economic self-interest has a disproportionately greater effect when it
comes to attitudes towards low-skilled immigration (Gerber et al., 2017). These studies show that
employment and fear of losing employment is a factor in immigration attitude formation.
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State Economic Context and Immigration Policy
Moving from a national economic context to a state-level context becomes more
important as immigration enforcement has become more decentralized. Because of this
decentralization and subsequent responsibility, states are now enacting their own legislation on
immigration enforcement and therefore studying the effect of state economic context on those
decisions has become increasingly important. There have been a few previous studies that have
highlighted the importance of the state economy to immigration attitudes (Dancygier &
Donnelly, 2013; Ybarra et al., 2016). Ybarra explored how state economies during the Great
Recession of 2007 affected immigration legislation and found that a record number of states
enacted restrictive immigration policies between 2005 and 2012 (2016). The study found that
this period was marked by fear of financial collapse (Ybarra et al., 2016). This fear negatively
influenced attitudes towards immigrants at the time who were again characterized as becoming
dependent off of social support and state welfare (Ybarra et al., 2016). This harkens back to
similar sentiments held during the 1990s, another period marked by overwhelmingly restrictive
immigration policies. Ybarra took the previous research of economic wellbeing on immigration
policy and studied it by state and finding that states experienced the Great Recession differently,
with some even experiencing boons, and that immigration policy enactment could be better
understood on a state level (Ybarra et al., 2016). They found that the economic strain felt by the
Great Recession had a different impact depending on the state, and that those with higher levels
of strain, had higher numbers of restrictive policies enacted, even while controlling for political
ideology (Ybarra et al., 2016).
Other studies further corroborate these findings showing that attitudes are more tied to a
state’s industry’s success versus the overall success of the nation’s economy (Dancygier &
12

Donnelly, 2013). Dancygier and Donnelly found that individuals employed in sector’s that were
growing were more likely to support accommodating immigration policies in comparison to
those whose employment was at risk in sectors that were shrinking (2013). Because states have
differing industries, this could have an effect on the immigration policy disparity that we are
seeing amongst states.
Political Ideology and Immigration Attitudes
Political ideology, a set of certain ethical ideals, principles and doctrines of a set group
that provides a blueprint for how society should function, is influential in the formation of
attitudes towards immigration policies (Brooks, Manza & Cohen, 2016). In respect to
immigration, attitudes range from restrictive to welcoming in regard to political ideology.
Research shows that self-identified Conservatives are more likely to show greater distrust and
hostility towards “out-groups,” or those not part of the majority culture, than their self-identified
Liberal counterparts, who are typically more tolerant of ambiguity and differences in culture,
lifestyle and identity (Brooks, Manza & Cohen, 2016). Expanding on this, the study also found
that Conservatives were more likely to hold negative attitudes regarding immigrants who don’t
closely resemble the dominant group and which they perceive to pose economic threats (Brooks
et al., 2016).
In another study which surveyed 21 Western democracies between 1970 and 2012 found
that political ideology had an even greater effect on attitude formation when in regard to asylum
seekers and undocumented immigrants (Natter, Czaika, & Haas, 2020). Asylum seekers and
undocumented immigrants are some of the most vulnerable immigrant populations as they are at
risk of being deported in the case of undocumented immigrants and trafficked or left in
dangerous situations in the case of asylum seekers (Natter et al., 2020). They also happen to be
13

the most vilified in the political rhetoric (Natter et al., 2020). When comparing attitude
formations within the Conservative ideology, it has been found that rural conservatives hold
more restrictive views than even their suburban or urban counterparts (Fennelly & Federico,
2008). The study does not explore the reasoning for this be it less interaction with immigrant
populations or failing economies in rural areas.
Conceptual Model
The conceptual model below displays the breakdown of impact from national economic
context to individual attitudes towards immigration policies. National economic context has an
impact on state-level economic context, political ideology formation, individual income and
employment status. These factors in turn have a reciprocating impact back onto national
economic context. State-level economic context has an impact on political ideology, individual
income and employment status and national economic context, which all have a reciprocating
impact back on state-level economic context. Individual income and employment status both
have an impact on formation of individual attitudes towards immigration policies, national
economic context and state-level economic context, which all have a reciprocating impact back
on individual income and employment status. Political ideology has an impact on individual
attitudes towards immigration policies, state-level economic context and national economic
context, which all three have reciprocating impact on political ideology. Individual attitudes
towards immigration has reciprocating impact on all the preceding factors.
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Conceptual Model

Summary of Relevant Literature
Studies on the economic effects on immigration attitudes have found that in times of
economic struggle, restrictive immigration attitudes peak (Jaret, 1999), and that economic
fluctuations have an impact not only on individual attitudes toward immigration, but also a
lasting effect on policy implementation (Kim & Fording, 2001; Ybarra et al., 2016). Due to the
decentralization of immigration enforcement, a disparity in immigration policy implementation
is being experienced (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019; Sáenz, 2013). Research examining the
relationship between attitudes towards immigration and economic wellbeing have tend to focus
on the national economy’s relationship to individual attitudes, or state economies’ relationship to
policy enactment. Yet states are a key player in immigration integration, as shown in their
implementations of both restrictive and accommodating immigration policies. Looking at the
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effect of economic context on immigration attitudes, this study aims to fill the gaps by looking at
the relationship between state-level economic context and individual attitudes towards
immigration policies. Yet further questions remain unanswered and so my research tests if
economic vulnerability due to income and employment status correlates with restrictive attitudes
towards immigration policies. The study further analyzes the effect of political ideology on
attitudes towards immigration policies and if that holds more sway than does economic context.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
To answer these questions, I examined the relationship between state-level economic context and
immigration attitudes using data from the 2018 American Values Survey (AVS) conducted by
the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) and the State Economic Coefficient Index (SECI),
produced by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve. How does state-level economic wellbeing affect
relate to individual attitudes towards immigration policies? Specifically, does living in a state
with lower levels of state economic wellbeing predict support for restrictive immigration
policies? Or the reverse, do higher levels of state-level economic wellbeing predict support for
welcoming policies like sanctuary? Do individual factors like income and employment status
impact the relationship? How does political ideology affect this relationship?
Data
I used data from the American Values Survey (AVS) to quantify attitudes toward
immigration policy and from the FED Reserve Board to measure state-level economic wellbeing.
The AVS is conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a nonprofit and
nonpartisan research organization dedicated to exploring the changing political, cultural, and
social landscape of the United States (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). PRRI surveys a
representative panel of the U.S. population using random sampling through mail solicitation and
phone surveys. Each respondent is then assigned a weight in order to ensure the sample closely
matches U.S. demographic makeup factors of gender, age, education, race and Hispanic
ethnicity, and division (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018), housing type, and telephone
usage to match U.S. Census parameters (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). All surveys
are provided in both Spanish and English (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). The AVS is
collected yearly and raw data files become public access after one year for researchers to use as
17

secondary data and to inform the public on changing attitudes and opinions (Public Religion
Research Institute, 2018. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 2.8 percentage points at the
95% level of confidence. The 2018 survey has a sample size of 2,509 and representation from
each state, allowing for state level disaggregation.
I used the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s State Economic Coefficient Index (SECI) to
examine state level economic wellbeing. The SECI combines the four state level factors of
nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers,
the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements plus proprietors’ income deflated by
the consumer price index to define state economic wellbeing (Ybarra et al., 2016). The SECI
reports monthly, making it a great choice to focus in on the specific time period of the 2018
AVS, and helping to eliminate threats to validity. Data for nonfarm payroll employment, the
unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing, and the consumer price index was
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and wages and salary disbursement data by state
was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve in
order to calculate the SECI (Philadelphia Federal Reserve, 2020).
Measures
In order to operationalize the variables of attitudes towards immigration policies, political
ideology, individual income and employment status, I used data from the 2018 AVS. To
operationalize economic context data on a state level, I used the Philadelphia Federal Reserve
SECI score.
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Individual Attitudes towards Immigration Policies
I measured attitudes towards immigration policies using six different questions that ask
respondents to state how much they agree or disagree on a Likert scale with a specific type of
policy, given in Table 1 below. Types of immigration policies fell into two broad categories
according to whether they would restrict of welcome immigration. Four questions, those
regarding building a border wall, imposing stricter immigration limits, prohibiting refugees from
entering the country, and separating families at the border were coded as restrictive. Responses
to these restrictive policy questions of strongly favor were coded as 5, favor as 4, don’t know as
3, oppose as 2 and strongly oppose as 1. Two questions, those regarding granting a pathway to
citizenship to unauthorized immigration brought to the U.S. as children and limiting local
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, were coded as welcoming. Responses to
these welcoming policies were reverse coded with strongly favor coded as 1, favor as 2, oppose
as 3 don’t know, 4 as oppose and strongly oppose as 5. A composite score was then calculated by
summing the scores from the six question. Possible score range from 6-30. This numerical value
represents attitudes towards immigration policies and lower scores show support for more
welcoming policies and higher scores shows support for more restrictive policies.
Table 1. Policy Coding

(table continued)
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State Average Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies
In order to analyze the data on a state-level basis as well, I operationalized state average
attitudes towards immigration policies using the same score determination as for individual
attitudes. These scores were then used to find a state-average variable by compiling all scores
from residents in that state and finding the mean score. This number also falls in a range from 630 with lower scores reflecting more welcoming attitudes and higher scores reflecting more
restrictive attitudes.
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State Economic Wellbeing
I measured state economic wellbeing using the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s State
Economic Coefficient Index (SECI). The SECI combines state level factors of nonfarm payroll
employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment
rate, and wage and salary disbursements plus proprietors’ income deflated by the consumer price
index (Ybarra et al., 2016). The SECI reports monthly, making it a great choice to focus in on the
specific time period of the 2018 AVS, and helping to eliminate threats to validity. The monthly
SECI score is compared against the previous month’s score to derive a net increase or decrease
in state wellbeing. (Philadelphia Federal Reserve, 2020). The greater the net change in score, the
better the state economic wellbeing. A lower, or even negative, score shows lower levels of state
economic wellbeing. Using the October 2018 SECI data produced scores with a range of -0.14 to
0.72 in net changes. Scores from October 2018 SECI are represented in the map below.
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Political Ideology
To operationalize political ideology, I will use political party affiliation as a proxy for
political ideology. I used the question from the 2018 AVS that specifically asked if the
respondent considered themselves a Republican, Democrat or Independent. I only used responses
that fell into one of these categories and respondents were coded as one of the options based on
their survey response.
Individual Income
Data from the demographic question section in the 2018 AVS asking respondents to
identify which category they fall into. The categories range from less than $5,000 a year to over
$200,000 dollars a year.
Individual Employment
Individual employment status was operationalized using data from the 2018 AVS from
the question asking respondents to define their employment status. The possible response
categories were working as a paid employee; working, self-employed; not working, on
temporary layoff from a job; not working, looking for work; not working, retired; not working,
disabled; or not working, other.
Analytical Strategy
I hypothesized that SECI will have a negative relationship with support for restrictive
immigration attitudes such as a support for border wall construction, placing stricter limits on
number of legal immigrants, preventing refugees from entering the country, and family
separation at the border while states. In other words, individuals living in states experiencing

22

higher economic vulnerability will hold more restrictive immigration attitudes. Conversely, I
hypothesized that those living in less economically vulnerable states will hold less restrictive
attitudes and more supportive of welcoming policies like sanctuary policies and allowing
undocumented children brought to the country a pathway to legal resident status.
Similarly, I hypothesized that after combining state score for attitudes, there will be a
similar relationship between that and SECI. I hypothesize that a negative relationship will exist
between state attitudes and SECI, meaning that more restrictive attitudes will exist in states that
are more economically vulnerable. Again, I used Pearson’s r coefficient analysis to study this
relationship.
I examined the relationship between state average attitudes towards immigration policies
and SECI, individual income level and attitudes towards immigration policies, using a test of
correlation and Pearson’s r coefficient. This allows me to study the relationship between the two
continuous variables. A correlation test measures the extent to which the variables are related
and how well one variable can predict another. Using this strategy I can determine if state-level
economic wellbeing can predict individual immigration attitudes. Pearson’s r will be used as the
correlation coefficient and will determine the slope of the line that best fits the scatterplot. The
sign, either negative or positive, denotes the direction of the relationship, and the numerical
value, between -1 and 1, demonstrates the strength of the relationship. Negative one would be a
perfect negative relationship and positive one would be a perfect positive relationship.
When looking at the question from an individual level, I hypothesized that individual
attitude scores will have a negative relationship with both income levels and employment status.
This would mean that higher levels of both income and employment status have a correlation
with lower attitude scores and favoring more accommodating immigration policies. I hypothesize
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when analyzing the relationship between income levels and attitudes towards the support for
allowing cities to limit cooperation with the national government’s efforts to enforce
immigration laws, better known as sanctuary policies, a positive relationship will exist. In other
words, higher levels of personal income would correlate with support for sanctuary policies.
Similarly, when looking specifically at the question of support for sanctuary policies, I
hypothesize that individual income level and employment status will both have a significant
positive relationship with support for sanctuary policy. This would mean that higher levels of
income and employment would correlate with higher support for sanctuary policies.
Furthermore, I hypothesize that when analyzing the difference in immigration attitudes
amongst the political ideologies of Democratic, Republican and Independent, that Republican
will hold higher scores, Independent more moderate scores, and Democratic will hold the lowest
scores of all three. This would mean that Republican ideologies hold more restrictive views,
Independent as more moderate, and Democratic as more accommodating in their immigration
policy attitudes.
ANOVA analysis was used to analyze the differences in attitudes between the categorical
variables of income, employment, and political party affiliation in proxy for political ideology in
relation to attitude scores and support for sanctuary policies. ANOVA analysis will allow me to
determine if there is a statistically significant difference in scores amongst the groups and
Tukey’s post hoc will further demonstrate the average scores of each of those groups.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
I analyzed data from the 2018 AVS to explore the relationship between attitudes towards
immigration policies, economic context and political party affiliation. Specifically, I examined
the relationship between a composite attitude score and SECI at the state level, as well as
individual income and employment. I examine the difference in support for sanctuary policy
among individual income and employment levels. Additionally, I examine the relationship
between attitudes and individual political ideologies.
Participant Demographics
Table 1 presents the demographics of respondents (n=2,509). The majority (65.9%) of
respondents identified as White, non-Hispanic, lower than the U.S. Census Bureau’s population
estimates from 2019 showing a 76.3% makeup. 10.9% identified as Black, non-Hispanic, again
slightly lower than the Census estimate of 13.4%. 15.5% of respondents identified as Hispanic,
slightly lower that the 18.5% Census estimate, and 3% identified as Asian, non-Hispanic, also
slightly lower than the Census estimate of 5.9% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). The remaining
4.7% is made up of other, non-specified races and those identifying as two or more races. The
gender distribution of the sample shows that a slight majority (52.3%) of the respondents
identified as female, matching what is estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau (2019). The majority
(30.3%) of the sample were between 30 and 44 years old, with the 60+ age range constituting
29.1% of respondents. 14.8% were between the ages of 18 and 29 and 25.8% were between the
ages of 45 and 59. The political breakdown of the data found that those identifying as
Republican were 22.9%, Democrat as 36.6%, Independent as 35.1% and other as 4.4%. The
largest portion (10.6%) of respondents fell into the income category of $60,000 to $74,999
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category. 2.2% of respondents fell into the lowest income category of less that $5,000 while
2.9% fell into the highest of over $200,000 per year.
Table 1. Demographics (n=2,509)
Characteristic
Demographic:
Race/Ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Other, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
2+, non-Hispanic
Asian, non-Hispanic
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18-29
30-44
45-59
60+
Political party
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other
Income
Less than $5,000
$5,000 to $9,999
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999

%

n

65.9 1653
10.9 273
1.6
39
15.5 388
3.2
81
3
75
47.7 1196
52.3 1313
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14.8
30.3
25.8
29.1

372
760
647
730

22.9
36.6
35.1
4.4

575
918
880
110

2.2
2.6
4.4
4.5
6.2
5.9
6.3
4.5
8.2
9.1
10.6

56
66
110
112
155
149
158
113
206
228
266

$75,000 to $84,999
$85,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,999
$150,000 to $174,999
$175,000 to $199,999
$200,000 or more
Employment
Working - as a paid employee
Working - self-employed
Not working - on temporary layoff from a job
Not working - looking for work
Not working - retired
Not working - disabled
Not working - other

4.9
9.4
8.9
4.9
2.7
1.8
2.9

124
235
223
123
67
45
73

52.1 1308
9.8 245
0.6
15
5.3 132
18.4 462
7 176
6.8 171

Immigration Attitudes
Nearly half (46%) of respondents fell into the welcoming category, followed by moderate
immigration policy attitudes (36%), and then the lowest percent (18%) falling into the restrictive
category. Table 2 (n=1,184) describes the breakdown of attitude by which category of
welcoming, moderate, or restrictive they fall into. Welcoming attitudes includes responses
between 6 and 14, moderate includes those between 15 and 22, and restrictive includes those
between 23 and 30.
Table 2. Attitudes Towards Immigration (n=1,184)
Attitude
Welcoming
Moderate
Restrictive
Total

n

%

545
427
212
1184

46%
36%
18%
100%
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On average, attitude scores for the United States was 16.0969, with a standard deviation
of 6.57455, meaning the average scores deviated from the mean score nearly 6 points. Those
with lower scores reflected an overall more accommodating immigration attitudes and with
higher scores reflecting more restrictive attitudes. Scores ranged from the low of 7 to a high of
25.6667 on the possible scale from 6 to 30. The mean and standard deviation of average
immigration attitude score by state is represented in Table 3.
Table 3. State Average Immigration Attitudes
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana

Mean
17.7368
15.5
16.0938
15.5952
15.973
17.2
18
15.2857
16.633
15.5882
16.3333
17.9474
16.7222
16.8667
14.3
15.5
14.7273
14.2353
15.8696
12.6154
14.1429
15.3243
14.5789
15.9677
19.75
20
28

N
19
8
32
126
37
10
1
7
109
34
3
19
18
60
30
12
11
17
23
13
7
37
19
31
4
5

Std. Deviation
5.33169
5.04268
6.70272
5.8763
7.38424
5.84618
.
6.23737
6.7846
6.2237
2.08167
5.44134
6.51519
6.7785
6.45488
7.40393
5.76352
7.72601
7.08587
4.9923
3.89138
6.59568
6.40586
6.40044
4.78714
8.21584

North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming
Total

13.2927
17
17.4091
25.6667
16.9688
15.6667
15.4444
15.5417
17.4182
19.5
13.5455
17
21.5
15.4286
14
17.931
16.0506
15.8
17.3333
10.5
13.0476
17.1702
18.375
7
16.0969

41
1
22
3
32
6
9
48
55
14
11
31
2
7
8
29
79
10
18
2
21
47
8
1
1197

5.88746
.
6.10744
2.08167
6.93046
6.91857
5.31769
6.57189
6.95139
7.11175
7.75066
6.733
7.77817
6.55381
7.85584
6.32981
6.36275
7.26942
8.77161
6.36396
5.51794
7.28405
6.54517
.
6.57455

Attitudes Towards Immigration and Economic Context
I examined both individual level attitudes towards immigration policies and state average
attitudes in relation to SECI and found no significant relationship for either. Table 4 (n=1,197)
displays the correlation between individual attitudes towards immigration policies and SECI of
the state the resident resides in. A weak (-0.032) inverse relationship was found between the two
variables, showing that no significant relationship exists between lower SECI and more
restrictive individual attitudes towards immigration policies.
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Table 4. Relationship Between Individual Attitudes and SECI (n=1,197)

Variables

Correlation

SECI

SECI

Pearson Correlation

Ind. attitudes
1

-0.032

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.273

N
Ind. attitudes

Pearson Correlation

2509

1197

-0.032

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

0.273

N

1197

1197

As shown in Table 4 (n=50), I found a weak inverse relationship between state average
attitudes towards immigration attitudes and SECI (-0.003). This shows that there is no significant
relationship showing that states with lower SECI correlate with higher attitude scores, or more
restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies.
Table 4. Relationship Between State Average Immigration Attitudes and SECI (n=50)
Variables

Correlation
Pearson
SECI
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson
AvgStateAttitude Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

SECI

AvgStateAttitude
1

-0.003
0.982

-0.003
0.982

1

Individual Immigration Attitudes and Individual Economic Context
There was no significant difference in attitudes when comparing against different
individual incomes of respondents or employment status. Examining the relationship between
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individual income and attitudes resulted in a p of 0.963, meaning that no statistically significant
difference amongst the income categories was found (Table 5). This shows that lower income
categories have no significant difference in immigration attitudes than those with higher income
levels.
Additionally, no significant difference among the employment responses (p=0.963) was
found between the variables showing that levels of employment don’t vary significantly from
each other when it comes to attitudes towards immigration policies (Table 5).
Table 5. Individual Immigration Attitudes and Income and Employment (n=1,196)

Attitudes
Between Income Levels
Within Income Levels
Between Employment Levels
Within Employment Levels
Total

Sum of
Squares
355.07
51341.689
465.806
51230.952
51696.759

df
17
1179
6
1190
1196

Mean
Square
20.886
43.547
77.634
43.051

F
0.48

p
0.963

1.803

0.095

Support for Sanctuary Policy and Individual Economic Context
Using one-way ANOVA to analyze if responses to the question of supporting policies
allowing cities to limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, better known as
sanctuary policies, differed based on income level found no statistically significant (p=0.754)
difference (Table 6). This determines that income levels did not vary significantly in support for
sanctuary policies.
Similar results were found when analyzing the difference in sanctuary policy support
among employment status categories. No statistically significant difference (p=0.4) between
employment categories when it came to support for sanctuary policies (Table 7).
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Table 6. Income and Support for Sanctuary Policies (n=1,211)
Sanctuary Support

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p

Between Groups

26.985

17

1.587

0.75

0.754

Within Groups

2534.012

1194

2.122

Total

2560.997

1211

Table 7. Employment Status and Support for Sanctuary Policies (n=1,211)
Sanctuary Support
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
13.139
2547.858
2560.997

df
6
1205
1211

Mean Square
2.19
2.114

F
1.04

p
0.4

Immigration Attitudes and Political Party
The ANOVA analysis exploring the difference in attitude scores amongst political
ideologies produced a p value less than the significance level of 0.05 (p=0), determining that
there is a statistically significant difference in means between Republican, Democrats and
Independents (Table 8). Republicans scored on average 8.7631 points higher than Democrats and
5.07326 than Independents, reflecting an average attitude that is more restrictive in comparison
to their political counterparts. Table 9 (n=1,192) further describes the difference in attitudes by
revealing the mean scores of each group with Democratic reporting the lowest score (12.5833),
reflecting the most welcoming attitudes towards immigration policies; Independent with the
second lowest (16.2732), reflecting a more moderate attitudes; and Republicans reporting the
highest (21.3464), reflecting more restrictive attitudes. Table 9 also reflect the mean difference
between groups and shows that Republicans on average scored 8.76310 points higher than
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Democrats and 5.07326 points higher than Independents. Democrats scored on average 3.68984
points lower than Independents.
Table 8. Immigration Attitudes and Political Party (n=1,192)
Attitudes

Sum of Squares

Df

Mean Square

F

p

13213.547
38441.938
51655.485

3
1189
1192

4404.516
32.331

136.23

0

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Table 9. Tukey’s Post Hoc
Mean Difference
I
J
(I-J)
A Republican
A Democrat
8.76310*
An independent
5.07326*
A Democrat
A Republican
-8.76310*
An independent
-3.68984*
An independent
A Republican
-5.07326*
A Democrat
3.68984*
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Group

Std.
Error Sig.
0.43392
0
0.44082
0
0.43392
0
0.38945
0
0.44082
0
0.38945
0

N

Mean

Democrat

444

12.5833

Republican

280

21.3464

Independent

410

16.2732
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Lower
Bound
7.6468
3.9392
-9.8794
-4.6918
-6.2074
2.6879

Upper
Bound
9.8794
6.2074
-7.6468
-2.6879
-3.9392
4.6918

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
Discussion
I found significant differences in attitudes towards immigration policies across the
political ideologies of Democratic, Republican and Independent ideologies, consistent with
research finding that conservative ideologies often hold more restrictive views towards
immigration policies and vice versa (Brooks et al., 2016; Fennelly & Federico, 2008; Natter et
al., 2020). I found no significant relationship between state-level economic context and state
average attitudes towards immigration policies, nor was any relationship found on an individual
level. No significant differences in attitudes towards immigration policies were found among
varying levels of individual income or employment status. These finding are contrary to research
showing that when individuals are economically vulnerable, that economic context, not political
ideology had more impact on attitudes towards immigration policies (Kim & Fording, 2001).
I found no significant correlation between state economic context and individual attitudes
towards immigration policies (-0.032), nor between state economic context and state average
attitudes towards immigration policies (-0.003). This in inconsistent from what I hypothesized
based on the Ybarra (2016) study which found a significant relationship between state economic
health and passing restrictive immigration legislation. I had hypothesized that the passing of
immigration legislation would have similar results to attitudes towards immigration policies, but
my research does not back up this claim. Further research into the how attitude formations
inform legislation is needed in this area.
Research identified in the literature review by Kim and Fording (2001) as well as
Esposito and Finley (2019) pointed toward perception of and rhetoric surrounding the economy
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having a stronger relationship with attitudes towards immigration policies, than the individual
economic context itself. My research corroborates this research in finding no significant
relationship between individual income and immigration attitudes (p=0.963). Nor was any
significant relationship found between employment status and immigration attitudes (p=0.095).
The same was found when analyzing relationship between individual income and support for
sanctuary policies (0.754) and employment status and support for sanctuary policies (0.4),
producing no significant result. This is consistent with research showing that individual
economic contexts have less impact on immigration attitudes than does the perception of
nationwide economic contexts do (Kim & Fording, 2001; Esposito & Finley, 2019). Perhaps the
issue is more nuanced due to interaction factors in the economy combining multiple factors of
SECI, income and employment to understand the full story of attitude formation. Deeper studies
into the combination effects of these variables could reveal a more significant relationship.
Although economic context was not significant, I did find a significant difference (p=0)
when comparing attitudes towards immigration policies across political ideologies. Republicans
had the highest average score (21.3464), reflecting the most restrictive attitudes towards
immigration policies among the three political ideologies analyzed. Democrats held the lowest
score (12.5833), reflecting the most welcoming attitudes among the groups. These findings are
consistent with previous research from Brooks, Manza and Cohen (2016), which found that
conservative ideologies tend to show greater distrust and hostility to non-majority groups, while
liberal ideologies are typically more tolerant to differences. Independents held moderate attitudes
towards immigration policies (16.2732), which adds to the research that I found in the literature.
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Limitations
While the findings from this research help the social work community to narrow down
which social determinants effect attitudes towards immigration policies, results should be
considered in the context of certain limitations. Firstly, the data, while nationally representative,
was not representative at the state level. States with smaller population sizes including Alaska,
Montana or District of Columbia had less than 10 respondents, creating a limitation in the overall
data. Understanding this constraint, future researchers can structure their data collection to
provide a more representative sample from each state.
The sample from the 2018 AVS was weighted to closely reflected the demographic
makeup of the U.S. at the time (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018), but my analysis of
immigration attitudes may have been skewed by the 52% of respondents who were thrown out
due to missing data. There may also exist a bias in who skips these questions and skewing the
overall data. Not knowing why respondents skipped this question, be it that they had no opinion
or wished not to share their opinion, could lead to underrepresentation of certain demographics.
Because of this there could be a limitation in overall representation of U.S. demographic makeup
and wouldn’t be widely applicable.
Another possible limitation stems from the overall breadth of the of the survey itself. The
AVS is created each year to track the attitudes of American’s on a wide variety of social issues
that the U.S. is facing (Public Religion Research Institute, 2018). Because of this, only a small
portion of the survey is in regard to immigration, which could dilute the responses due to the
fatigue of taking the 110-question long survey. Creating a survey specifically tailored to
immigration attitudes without the other social attitude question could help to get a more precise
view into the desired variables.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
In this study I found a significant difference in attitudes towards immigration policies
across political party affiliations. Respondents who identified as Democrat, on average, held the
most welcoming attitudes towards immigration policies. Respondents who identified as
Republican, on average, held the more restrictive attitudes towards immigration policies.
Economic context, including SECI, individual income, and employment, were found to have no
significant relationship with individual or state-average attitudes towards immigration policies.
Similarly, individual income and employment had no significant relationship with support for
sanctuary policies. Understanding the relationship between these factors have, or don’t have, on
attitudes towards immigration attitudes can help to inform social work practice, policy, and
future research.
Implications for Policy
Finding a significant relationship between political ideology, or political party affiliation,
and attitudes towards immigration raises the issue of political divisiveness in relation to
comprehensive immigration reform. It highlights the issue originally found by the 2018 AVS,
that attitudes towards immigration policies are more divided than ever (Public Religion Research
Institute, 2018). These findings highlight that political party identification and affiliation is
difficult to change, especially when so tied to values and ideals (Carsey & Layman, 2006).
Recognizing which immigration policies have bipartisan support can help to bridge the
political divide and choose those policies to focus on first in immigration reform. According to a
survey conducted by Pew Research Center, around three-quarters of Americans, regardless of
political party, supported a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers (2020). A policy that is currently
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debated and could pass with this bipartisan support would be the American Dream and Promise
act, which would grant permanent legal status to undocumented immigrants who came to the
U.S. as children.
Another piece of legislation that could garner bipartisan support is the Farm Workforce
Modernization Act, which would create a pathway to citizenship to undocumented farm workers,
as well as reform the existing temporary agricultural work visa program. The reason this policy
could find bipartisan support is due to the population it targets: agricultural workers.
Undocumented farmworkers make up 70% of the agricultural workforce and contribute $9
billion annually to the fruit and vegetable industry, not including other farm industries (Danilo,
2020). Due to rural and agricultural voters often identifying as Republican (McDermott, 2009),
in order to support their constituents, Republican legislators may support this policy.
Recognizing which policies can be achieved without bipartisan support is also important
for policy advocates after understanding the political divide in attitudes towards immigration
policies. Executive Orders can be enacted without bipartisan support, and there are policies that
can potentially be reformed through this process. Increasing visa quotas is one change that can be
advocated for that would have a wide impact on immigration. Allowing more visas each year
would decrease the processing and wait times to receive those visas, which on average take
between 5 and 6 years (Bier, 2019).
Using the knowledge that political party affiliation has the greatest impact on attitudes
towards immigration policies in comparison to the other study factors, highlights the importance
of using windows of opportunity in which Democrats control the House, Senate, and Presidency.
These periods of opportunity should fully be taken advantage of and in these moments political
instigators can focus energies on bringing immigration reform to the forefront of the agenda.
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On average, Independents scored only 3.68984 points higher than Democrats in attitudes
towards immigration policies, showing that they hold more moderate attitudes in comparison to
Republicans. This highlights them as potential allies in immigration reform endeavors. Coupling
the forces of Democratic and Independent powers could help to bring more support for
welcoming immigration policies.
Implications for Practice
The relationship between attitudes towards immigration policies and political party
affiliation may create a difficult situation for social workers hoping to impact immigration
reform through practice. Political party affiliation, and specifically the beliefs and values ties to
is, is difficult to influence due to its inherent ties to those personal beliefs and values (Carsey &
Layman, 2006). Direct practice social workers must work to influence those beliefs and values if
we are to see change through education about benefits of immigration as well as combatting
misinformation surrounding immigration discussions and policies could help to challenge those
beliefs and values that are tied to political party affiliation. Additionally, education and
transparency concerning immigration policies in order to help Americans better understand how
those policies will benefit them could sway their attitudes towards immigration policies.
Education is an important factor of influence because it seeks not to criticize already held beliefs,
but to add to them and clarify.
Implications for Future Research
Finding the relationship between political party affiliation and attitudes towards
immigration policies, not economic context and attitudes towards immigration policies, was
more significant, pushes future research to focus on finding those policies that have bipartisan
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support, as well as researching why that is so. Additionally, further research into what has the
most impact on political party affiliation, and which factors have the potential to change that
affiliation.
Though my study found no significant relationship between economic context and
individual immigration attitudes, future research into how economic factors like individual
income, employment status, and economic context interact to influence individual attitudes
towards immigration policies could be beneficial to better explore the influence of economic
context. Another path for future research could be to fill in the gaps in Ybarra’s research (2016),
to better understand the process between attitude formation and immigration policy legislation.
Additionally, better understanding the interrelationship between economic context and political
ideology (Kim & Fording, 2001) on immigration attitudes would be beneficial as well. Finally,
research into how political ideology and economic context interact to influence individual
attitudes towards immigration policies could help to paint a clearer picture.
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